

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The National Security Strategy of September 2002 provides direction for preserving the peace and defending the interests of the United States. The nation's unparalleled military strength combined with its great economic and political influence provides the essential capability to defend the United States against forces that threaten human freedom and individual liberties. The challenge is, though, to effectively integrate and employ all elements of national power in an environment of expanding responsibilities and escalating competition for finite resources. This strategic research project will evaluate Navy and Marine Corps future concepts to determine how well those services support the executive direction provided in the current National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. It will assess how well the Navy and Marine Corps senior leadership's shared vision ensures naval forces control the seas, assure access, and project joint power ashore. For in order to effectively implement national policy across the full range of military operations, the intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the Department of the Navy are critical to the relevance of future naval forces and to the defense of national strategic interests.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

For nearly half a century, the “cold war” between democracy and communism guided the strategic vision embodied in the nation’s strategy of containment. The United States relied strategically on the NATO alliance, the Marshall Plan, and US military forces to inhibit the sphere of Soviet communist influence and to deter Soviet armed aggression. What will or should replace this strategy of containment? Seventeen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the national jury of professional scholars, political analysts, and senior military officers still actively debates the nation’s foreign policy development following the era of bipolar US-Soviet competition. The verdict is not yet out on what “variant of a hegemonic strategy the United States should pursue.”¹ Whether the United States reverts back to isolationism, continues with a strategy of primacy, or compromises with a strategy of selective engagement, one pillar of US power will remain constant in our global engagements: US military dominance.

However, the horrific events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath have challenged the unmatched capabilities of the US Armed Forces. Following that world-altering catastrophe, the United States was confronted with a multi-dimensional security challenge: combating a terrorist threat that transcends international borders while maintaining a homeland security that once was believed invincible. The relevance of a military force designed to “deter massive Cold War-era armies”² was called into question. Just as “the new world order that faced our country nearly a half a century ago was unlike any that had come before it,”³ the same could now be said today. What changes are required to fight and win against this new enemy? What military capabilities should reside in our future military force structure? Successful security of post 9/11 US national interests clearly requires employing multiple elements of national power. In combination with US foreign policy, components of economic influence and information operations along with the contribution of capable, relevant military forces will be required to address the strategic challenges that lie ahead.

The ever-changing threat to the nation and its allies requires a comprehensive assessment of defense strategy and force structure of the armed forces to implement that strategy. The architects of US defense strategy must build a plan that balances national objectives with the methods and resources available. Further refinement of the nation’s national security interests, along with the identification of current and future threats, will provide the United States with a solid foundation for development of America’s grand strategy for the 21st century. The challenge today is to understand the changing role of the armed forces in

supporting survival of the fundamental values and political institutions for which those forces heroically fought and sacrificed over the past two centuries to secure.

For the United States, the core national interests of preserving American security, bolstering economic prosperity, and promoting American values are fundamental national strategic objectives. How the nation's leaders visualize the methods for achieving these objectives determines the military's role. Put simply, the primary purpose of military forces is to "defend national interests, which are driven by security requirements and national values."⁴ This strategic research project will evaluate the future Navy and Marine Corps' operational warfighting concept to determine how well those services will support the national values of "freedom of trade, freedom of the seas, and autonomy of action"⁵ within the executive direction provided in current national strategic documents, including the challenges with properly resourcing that concept. It will assess how well the Navy and Marine Corps senior leadership's shared vision ensures naval forces control the seas, assure access, and project joint power ashore to effectively implement national policy across the spectrum of military operations. Specifically, the paper will include a review of the future operational concept, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS). The final section will address potential risks ahead for US military forces to continue their unparalleled successes into the 21st century.

Strategic Direction

In the present-day world, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation - or a coalition of nations - including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.

- Edward Mead Earle⁶

Earle's observations reaffirm the importance of the armed forces in the protection of the nation's strategic interests from the enemy. Professional military officers are obliged to comprehend the current strategic environment – particularly the political aims and outline of the national interests. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide the strategic vision for the defense of our country through a series of security documents mandated by Congress. The *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and *National Military Strategy*, augmented by the Quadrennial Defense Review, provide the key tenets from which to formulate the military component of the nation's defense plan.⁷ A review of the direction provided by each of these strategic documents can provide the foundation for development of future warfighting concepts.

The ability to defeat large armies and conventional forces provided our nation a blanket of protection against totalitarianism in the 20th century. But in the new millennium, the world has changed. The September 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) for the United States outlines some new challenges for the American military in the 21st century. The emergence of extremist groups that employ terrorist tactics and operate within networks across national boundaries has dramatically changed the strategic environment. Just as this threat has changed and diversified, the elements of national power must transform and broaden to support national security objectives. The strategic goals outlined in the NSS are categorically specific: ensuring the security of the American people; strengthening the community of free nations; and advancing democratic reform, freedom and economic well-being around the globe. American military forces' highest priority is to defend the United States against those who oppose basic human rights, political freedom, and promotion of free enterprise. The NSS outlines four key tasks the US military must accomplish to ensure the future security and prosperity of the nation:

- assure our allies and friends;
- dissuade future military competition;
- deter threats against US interests, allies, and friends; and
- decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails.⁸

The March 2005 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) provides the Secretary of Defense's guidance for implementing the Department of Defense (DoD) plan to support "the President's commitment to the forward defense of freedom."⁹ Two particular principles in the Secretary's implementation guidelines will influence future Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts: continuous transformation and capabilities-based approach. Continuous transformation is enacted through a controlled evolution of the armed forces to adapt and develop capabilities in order to maintain an operational advantage, since the "long-term struggle against persistent, adaptive adversaries"¹⁰ requires a redistribution of resources and new capabilities. Further, our military must adopt a capabilities-based approach for planning and implementing the defense strategy. This approach to planning focuses on *how* adversaries challenge the national security (not on *who* the adversaries are) and proposes a range of capabilities and methods to address the uncertain future.¹¹ Another key element in the NDS is the Secretary of Defense's direction for desired capabilities and attributes. The NDS specifies eight operational capabilities for each service to focus on within the transformation process: (1) strengthen intelligence; (2) protect critical bases of operation; (3) operate from the global commons; (4) project and sustain forces in distant anti-access environments; (5) deny enemies' sanctuaries; (6) conduct network-centric operations; (7) improve proficiency against irregular challenges; and (8) increase capabilities of

partners – international and domestic.¹² Additionally, the NDS articulates the Secretary's overall intent for defending the nation: create favorable security conditions around the world and continue to transform how we think about security, how we formulate strategic objectives, and how we adapt to achieve our strategic direction.¹³ Finally, the NDS outlines several ways to implement the country's defense strategy:

- influence events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable;
- build upon efforts of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review;
- develop an adaptable, global approach that acknowledges the limits of our intelligence, anticipates surprises, and positions us to handle strategic uncertainty; and
- prepare the Department of Defense to meet 21st century challenges.

The Chairman's *National Military Strategy* (NMS) then clarifies the military's role in implementing the NDS. The NMS describes the strategic environment, identifies national military objectives, and outlines a strategy designed to contribute to the achievement of those objectives. The NMS specifies the ways (how we accomplish our objectives) and means (resources available for planning) for military support of the country's defense strategy. The NMS also assesses the capabilities and adequacy of US forces to execute the stated strategy. In effect, the NMS refines the NDS guidance and translates the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) findings into strategic military objectives. The 2004 NMS includes three priorities: "...win the War on Terrorism,...enhance our ability to fight as a joint force,...[and] transform the Armed forces 'in stride'."¹⁴

Lastly, all of this strategic guidance is supplemented by the QDR, a congressionally-mandated comprehensive review of national defense strategy, programs, and resources. The QDR materially indicates how the military is supporting national defense strategy consistent with the NSS by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan that supports the full range of missions assigned to the military.¹⁵ The QDR provides an opportunity to review and structure US military programs for the next 20 years – either to reshape the direction of a program or to reinforce the current course of action. The QDR is the "principal strategy tool" for the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) to craft national level strategy.¹⁶ To date, there have been three complete cycles of the QDR. The most recent QDR report was just published in February 2006. The previous report was released in September 2001,¹⁷ just prior to the United States entering the global war of terrorism. The primary focus of that review was to outline a plan to transform the military from a "cold war" posture to a more capable and deployable force equipped to defeat 21st century threats. The 2006 QDR, driven by the historic events of

September 2001, is the first comprehensive review of US military contributions to the nation's defense following "the rise of global Islamic terrorism."¹⁸ Additionally, this Department of Defense-led review was heavily influenced by the "the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing threat of a nuclear North Korea and Iran, and the tightening energy markets that could lead to tensions with developing powers like China."¹⁹ Defense analysts, military leadership, and senior government officials now must debate the merits of this document and its description of future warfighting concepts in support of the national security strategy. Is the exhaustive review transformational? Is it old ideas just re-packaged? Or is it just reflective of previous reviews where the Defense Department "failed to anticipate [the global] long war with Islamist terrorists?"²⁰

A final critical area in developing a military strategy is founded on the historical success of innovative flexibility and support. Military power is a product of measurable quantities (numbers and type of personnel, equipment, and weaponry) and intangible qualities (leadership, morale, and discipline). The current US military power equation yields a rating second to none. However, the challenge to US military forces in the 21st century is how to sustain this power by preparedness through flexibility. The force structure must continuously adapt to the changing spectrum of war. As the US grand strategy continually adapts to address domestic and international interests and provide for national security, our military will be asked to perform tasks ranging from direct conventional action to counterinsurgency operations to humanitarian assistance. NSC-68, a report to the National Security Council during the Truman administration, used broad terms to define US political objectives. But to be successful now, both grand and military strategies must be precise and defined in measurable terms with definitive goals and objectives. If the objectives of grand strategy are not clear, it will be difficult to synthesize the military sub-component strategy. Continual refinements of the national military strategy in the wake of clearly defined US interests and goals will better provide a direction for future defense force visions.

Another key element of our nation's grand strategy is budgetary support. Typically, while the national strategy promises much in peacetime, it is not willing to pay for force requirements. Whatever the national commitments are, the grand strategy must provide the full requirements of the armed forces, both fiscally and politically. The original conditions of NSC-68 committed 20 percent of the nation's gross national product (GNP) for military expenditures. Through successive administrations, the military's budget has eroded to just three percent of the country's GNP today. And all the while, the nation's commitments of our armed forces have increased dramatically. The extent to which government officials and the American public are

willing to expend the nation's resources overseas will directly affect the global stabilization and ultimately US security worldwide. So the two challenges that must be addressed in a top-level comprehensive review of national defense requirements are the ongoing, extensive global military commitments and the balance of priorities between current readiness / operations and future transformation.

First, the global war on terrorism, the "long war," specifically in Iraq, will require the efforts of considerable military forces for several years. Other regional areas will also require US military presence for the foreseeable future – Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea. There are other problematic regions that require close observation as well, as the global war on terrorism transcends national boundaries. These real missions and other plausible scenarios require extensive force commitments.²¹

The second challenge for the senior DoD leadership is how to avoid a "defense train wreck."²² The resources provided to the naval service in the coming years will continually be constrained, so available funding must be expended on those areas which afford the greatest return. US forces must maintain a high level of readiness; remaining prepared for two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. But demands on DoD forces for security operations continue to rise as international conditions become more challenging. Modernization costs are also rising, along with costs of the increased operations and their related support. Additionally, each service requires the integration of new weapons and technologies into its transformation plan. Will the DoD budget support current readiness while concurrently financing the future weapon initiatives in the transformation plan? Will the budget be sufficient to keep current forces ready to fight while financing modernization? As the United States wrestles with these budgetary challenges, the armed forces are in a period of critical self-evaluation.²³ Particularly, because future military operations will be joint, each service must identify its specific requirements to support the nation's security strategy while still complementing the other forces. Individual service forces must be both capable and affordable, supported by relevant concepts.

Future Operational Warfighting Concepts – A Shared Vision

Another driver of concepts developments is the guidance provided by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). The CNO's 2006 guidance articulates his vision of ensuring American security, open and free sea lanes, and combat-ready forces forward deployed in support of the Joint Force Commander. Admiral Mullen, the Navy's 28th CNO, particularly emphasizes one guiding principle for mission success: naval teamwork. He stresses the advantages of the special relationship between the Navy and

Marine Corps and declares that this service synergy provides the nation with “versatile military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.”²⁴ Additionally, the CNO identifies tasks to achieve the objectives and desired effects of increased Navy-Marine Corps contributions to the Joint Force, to include “further [developing] the Sea Basing concept...in support of future expeditionary operations.”²⁵

When General M. W. Hagee assumed duties as the 33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps in January 2003, he immediately emphasized the security challenges in the world’s littorals. The Commandant stressed the importance of building a shared “sustained expeditionary culture”²⁶ with the Navy as challenges in the littorals will increase our nation’s reliance on expeditionary forces. He further emphasized that preparation for the future will require a naval force whose strength resides in its ability to project forces from land and sea bases. Sea-basing and distributed operations, coupled with the capabilities of expeditionary maneuver warfare will “enhance and transform [Marine Corps] capabilities for forcible entry from the sea.”²⁷

Thus, a consistent, focused approach to the development of future warfighting concepts is enabling the Navy and Marine Corps to progress in the transformation of its forces. The naval services have built upon a shared operational concept in their current service visions of *Sea Power 21* and *Marine Corps Strategy 21*. *Sea Power 21* provides a clear vision of how to “organize, integrate, and transform”²⁸ the US Navy to meet future threats and challenges. Implementing these capabilities will enable the Navy to “significantly further the integration of joint and international forces for greater warfighting effectiveness.”²⁹

To prepare for the wide array of threats facing us, we must organize ourselves around a clear, concise, and powerful vision of what the Navy will provide to our nation in the decades ahead. This vision must build on U.S. strengths -- our asymmetric advantages -- such as information superiority, sea control, mobility, stealth, reach, precision, and firepower.

- Admiral Vern Clark,
Former Chief of Naval Operations³⁰

Admiral Clark’s remarks during the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College on 12 June 2002 provided insight into the principles developed by the US Navy to support the President’s NSS. The three central capabilities outlined in the Navy’s new operational construct for the 21st century are:

- ***Sea Strike***, the projection of dominant and decisive offensive power;
- ***Sea Shield***, the projection of defensive power from the sea; and

- **Sea Basing**, the projection of sovereignty around the world to team with and provide enhanced support for joint forces afloat and ashore.³¹

Marine Corps Strategy 21 likewise provides the Marine Corps with the vision and goals to support the development of future combat capabilities. It focuses Marine Corps' efforts and resources toward a common objective. Assured access from the sea provides the geographic combatant commander with increased options in forcible entry operations and with flexible responses across the complex spectrum of conflicts. The key enablers of amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces and the unique capabilities they bring support national objectives and protect national interests. Finally, increasing the operational reach of naval forces through forward presence provides the United States with a singular capability to rapidly and effectively seize opportunities and respond to challenges that threaten national interests.

Defining an Operational Concept Bridge to the Future - OMFTS

Since the traditional and long-standing threat of the "cold war" has ended, the operating environment has changed. The United States has entered a transitional period and a significant challenge in refining the nation's security strategy is identification of the future enemy. This then entails formulation of a strategy founded on national objectives and focused on an anticipated but unknown threat. Analysis of the threat possibilities includes description of the operating environment where threats are most likely to be engaged. As the nation's strategy shifts from addressing a known global threat to focusing on regional challenges and opportunities, these changes require a revision in the military's operating procedures.

A critical component of the US security strategy is sustainment of US superiority within the operational commons – the sea, space, and air.³² Exploitation of the sea is a primary mission for US Naval forces and a key enabler of US global power. Command of the sea lines of communication, among other things, permits the United States to rapidly project forces forward into remote areas of operation in times of war (1991 Persian Gulf, 1993 Somalia, and 2001 Afghanistan). In order for the United States to maintain an active "global foreign policy,"³³ its military forces must maintain an aggressive worldwide presence that continues to command the commons. Thus, maritime dominance remains a primary goal of US Naval Forces.

But, after the fall of the Soviet Union and absent a threat in the open oceans, the US Navy "began to reorient itself toward affecting matters ashore."³⁴ Fundamental to this process is defining the concepts for future requirements and developing appropriate doctrine. The Department of the Navy White Papers ...*From the Sea and Forward...From the Sea* outline the Navy and Marine Corps' common vision for the future enabling force and provide the foundation

for developing a combat strategy for the littorals. In particular, these concepts establish the long-term strategic direction of the Marine Corps' approach to warfare by describing the operational capabilities of its future warfighting force.

The operational concept derived from the documents ...*From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* is *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS). OMFTS provides an innovative approach to naval operations with an "unprecedented emphasis on littoral areas [and] requires...intimate cooperation between [expeditionary forces]."³⁵ The key to the successful transition of a 21st century warfighting force is to accurately define the operational environment, precisely understand the baseline tenets of future warfighting requirements, and critically perform a thorough analysis of the resulting innovative ideas that are presented, discussed, and ultimately put to the test. Thus, understanding and implementing OMFTS is the first step in the successful development of a future, viable naval warfighting capability.

OMFTS: The Operating Environment

Ongoing migration of the world's population to the coastal regions of the continents increased the importance of a military capability to operate in the land-sea interface. Coupled with the nation's dependence on the world market and support for regional allies, US Naval forces shifted from an open-ocean, blue-water maritime strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus. In effect, the nation needed a fundamentally different naval force to respond to the littoral and expeditionary missions. *From the Sea* announced this landmark shift in operational focus and reordered the coordinated priorities of the Naval Service. While this shift in focus to littoral operations has required a corresponding shift toward adaptation of existing forces to counter littoral threats, the future still includes a requirement for the capability to project power ashore and "exploit enemy weaknesses across the entire spectrum of conflict."³⁶ To command the seas in the littorals, our naval forces must concentrate even more on capabilities required in this complex operating environment, as mastery of the littorals does not necessarily follow from a command of the high seas.

OMFTS: The Baseline Tenets

Understanding the baseline tenets, sea-basing, maneuver warfare, and shared vision, set forth in OMFTS is essential to success of the 21st century Navy-Marine Corps warfighting force. OMFTS provides operational direction in three distinct areas: further integration of the naval expeditionary force; revolutionized forcible entry operations; and expanded maritime maneuver across the spectrum of conflict - from disaster relief to maintaining or restoring order in civil disturbances to full-scale confrontations between two large forces. Military operations in the

littoral environment will occur in a single battlespace with different operating forces sharing a common vision; organized and trained as a team. Future forces must have the capability to move rapidly from the ship to the objective and back without interruption; they must maintain the capability to project power ashore in a wide variety of situations to overcome forces of varying resistance.

OMFTS represents a departure from traditional amphibious operations. This operational concept provides the Joint Task Force commander with the capability to maneuver combat forces from the sea to the decisive objective area without the traditional amphibious operations of first securing a beachhead then pausing while forces establish and consolidate a lodgment ashore. Freed from the constraints of establishing a large beachhead, the landing force commander can focus on rapidly and decisively engaging the enemy. OMFTS provides a capability for sea-based forces to strike from over the horizon direct to an objective. This revolutionary approach to amphibious warfare enables naval forces to focus on an operational objective using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against critical enemy vulnerabilities. Through the development of enhanced tactical capabilities in the areas of sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control, naval forces need not establish large shore-based logistics depots and provide rear area security to protect those depots.

Additionally, OMFTS as a future warfighting concept is based on the principles of the nature of war and principles of maneuver warfare. War will remain a struggle between two hostile forces, each trying to impose its will on the other. Within that struggle, maneuver warfare provides a commander with the capability for rapid, flexible, and simultaneous engagements to bypass enemy defenses and ultimately shatter his moral, mental, and physical cohesion. The tenets of OMFTS echo the principles of maneuver warfare: focus on the enemy, employ strength against weakness, generate and exploit advantage, and achieve decisive superiority at the right time and place. However, OMFTS focuses on the sea as an operational starting point and on-going source of sustainment for the duration of the operation. To help overcome the challenges of this environment, OMFTS provides enhanced capabilities in the following warfighting functional areas: command and control; intelligence; maneuver; logistics; fires; and force protection.³⁷

- Command and control – ensuring increased situational awareness, shared information, joint interoperability, and informational dominance.

- Intelligence – providing the joint force with tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level intelligence, accessible to and tailored for all participants; identifying enemy's center-of-gravity and how best to attack it; and focusing on identifying the opposition's intent.
- Maneuver – generating an operational tempo advantage by penetrating to the full depth of the objective area and shifting forces at will to facilitate simultaneous engagement.
- Logistics – providing the logistical support needed throughout mission depth and duration.
- Fires – providing lethal and non-lethal air-, ground-, and sea-based fires that impact both the area of influence and the area of interest.
- Force Protection – ensuring protection from space-, air-, sea-, land-, and information-based threats.

OMFTS: Future Direction

First, it should be admitted that initial attempts to make radical changes inevitably will be flawed. Second, it should be noted that radical changes require considerable prerequisite innovative thought to reduce cost, error, and resistance. Lastly, it should be acknowledged that implementation of radical changes is usually very expensive. Proposals for change must be tempered by common sense and a realistic view of fiscal constraints. The Navy and Marine Corps anticipate some challenges in integrating their warfighting philosophy with the OMFTS concept. Experimental implementation and concept testing by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and Naval Warfare Development Command provide a forum for effective integration of new ideas and technology with innovative organizational, doctrinal, and training initiatives. OMFTS is not a pie-in-the-sky venture. It is solidly and realistically grounded, certainly worthy of trial if not ultimate acceptance.

However, the US Navy and Marine Corps must continue to develop and refine their capabilities and procedures to ensure their relevance in supporting the nation's security and prosperity so as to enact operational concepts that support the nation's security strategy. Specifically, the two services must possess strategic capabilities and weapon systems that support "advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces."³⁸

Just as the Marine Corps was transformed from a second land Army following World War Two, the Marine Corps must now transition into its next strategic inflection point.³⁹ The nature of war and maneuver warfare remains the same. However, changes in the threat and the shift

to littoral operations, coupled with the Corps' increased tactical capabilities, require a shift in the Marine Corps' warfighting concept. The publication of the capstone document Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare outlines the future warfighting concept for the Marine Corps and is founded on the operational concept of OMFTS.

Integrating OMFTS into the Marine Corps will require three concurrent and interrelated efforts: making Marines, procuring and experimenting with advanced technologies, and institutionalizing innovation.⁴⁰ Although the Marine Corps broadly focuses its improvement efforts on doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support (DOTES), the critical area for improvement is in equipment. While all areas of DOTES can separately or collectively contribute to an increase in a force's capabilities, the lead time required to field a new system or individual piece of equipment can take 12 to 20 years through the normal Department of Defense procurement process. Therefore, early identification and documentation of system deficiencies will allow procurement services the opportunity to work with industry sooner and ultimately field the required equipment consistent with doctrine, organization, and training change timelines. Other key elements of DOTES can then be further refined as the equipment is fielded. Institutional innovation constrained only by fiscal realities and human imagination is the key factor in implementing future warfighting concepts.

Lastly, reductions in fiscal resources constrain the Marine Corps to refocus its limited assets on only the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges. The Marine Corps has a requirements-based procurement process; its goal is to focus the procurement strategy only on systems that best support the unique capabilities and projected concepts of the Marine Corps. Accordingly, the OMFTS concept will be built around the MV-22 Osprey, the family of expeditionary fighting vehicles, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the next generation of amphibious shipping. This equipment will fundamentally determine the warfighting capability outlined in OMFTS. Success of the Marine Corps' 21st century warfighting force will then reside in the innovation of doctrine, organization, training initiatives, and support structure that best utilize this equipment. As the procurement process matures with each of these programs, continued innovation in command, control, and surveillance and force sustainment will also be required to successfully execute the future warfighting concepts of the Marine Corps.

While quality people with innovative ideas have been and will remain the critical element of the Marine Corps, the aggressive pursuit of new technologies and procurement of equipment is also fundamental to the implementation of the next century's fighting force. But the overall success of the Corps in the 21st century will require more than just the procurement of new equipment. It will require an institutional commitment to change along with critical evaluation of

the Corps' warfighting concept. OMFTS combines maneuver warfare with future technological advances in intelligence, speed, mobility, firepower, and communications to provide a bridge to the future warfighting force of the Marine Corps. Marines must embrace the need for change and the potential that OMFTS offers.

Conclusion – Risk Ahead

The Soviet Union's collapse launched the international system into a period of transition whose end remains unclear. We may ultimately see the emergence of new great powers, but we may also be headed toward a much more fragmented system strewn with new transnational actors and civil conflict in disintegrating states.

- Thomas L. McNaugher⁴¹

McNaugher asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union decisively signaled the end of the "cold war." The US strategy for winning that war and defeating the Soviet Union was a direct outgrowth of the National Security Council Document NSC-68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security." That document provided the strategic framework that enabled the United States ultimately to defeat communism, thereby illustrating how closely coordinated uses of the elements of national power were fundamentally critical to addressing threats to the nation's interests. The strategic policy of containment paved the way for ultimately defeating communism. An executive review of defense strategy and force structure provides the first step towards determining the next viable 21st century national security strategy.

But McNaugher also predicts the challenges of the future threat. How does combating the next threat fit with the strategic direction of the country: expansion and protection of democracy, containment of radical Islamic fundamentalism, protection of human rights, and promotion of a global economy?⁴² What will be the strategy for dealing with that threat and ensuring national security? And what will be the central characteristics of that threat? Precise identification of new threats is essential to the future direction of our policies and ultimately to development of a successful grand strategy. Additionally, besides threat confrontation, what other missions might be out there? The current administration continues to engage and employ our military forces in a variety of confrontations and non-warfighting operations, further leading to speculation and debate over what precise direction the US foreign policy is heading.

But how do our military means relate to political ends? While the US security strategy is no longer focused on another global superpower, the Navy and Marine Corps' role in the national military strategy remains centered on strategic deterrence, sea control and maritime

supremacy, and strategic sealift. The changes in the threat and projected operating environment require adaptability within the naval forces in the development of a future warfighting philosophy. As America progresses into the next century as the world's lone great power, with unprecedented economic, political and military supremacy, refinement of a comprehensive, viable grand strategy is of utmost importance in an uncertain world. The challenge for strategists then, is to look to the future with a glimpse of the past. While a look back at some of the basic factors that led to the US victory in World War II and the "cold war" may provide a guide to future prosperity, we must focus strategically outward on an ever-shrinking global community while continually remaining engaged with domestic issues. The intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the Department of the Navy will be critical to the relevance of future naval forces and to the defense of national strategic interests. Specifically, successful development of future warfighting concepts requires a broad review of strategic direction, definition of an operational concept, a unified vision, and properly resourced military forces.

The American forefathers, wary of foreign entanglements, adopted a foreign policy of isolationism prior to World War II; however, modern globalization will no longer permit the United States such a strategy. Globalization has forced us to rely on economic and military coalitions to assure security of our national interests. The key to the longstanding success of these and future alliances will be establishment of common goals and interests. Sun Tzu reminds of the potential times ahead in a period of uncertainty:

It is doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible.⁴³

Endnotes

¹ Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons, The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," in *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England: MIT Press, 2004), 4.

² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 29.

³ S. Nelson Drew, *NSC-68 Forging the Strategy of Containment with analyses by Paul H. Nitze* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 1996): 1.

⁴ Don DeYoung, "Strategic Vision Can Be Powerful," *Proceedings* 126/11/1,173 (November 2000): 3.

⁵ DeYoung, 3.

⁶ U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, *Strategic Level of War Syllabus* (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), 1.

⁷ U.S. Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army, 2006), 59. Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act mandated the President to annually transmit to Congress “a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States.” OSD and the Joint Staff are responsible for the drafting and implementation of a number of national level strategies on a periodic basis. These include the National Defense Strategy (NDS), representing the SECDEF’s view of the national strategy for defense resources, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), intended to serve as the actual blueprint for those resources. In addition, the Joint Staff develops the NMS. In each case, the strategy originates with the National Security Strategy (NSS) which is developed by the National Security Council staff. All three of these strategies are linked and designed to help implement the nation’s overall strategic aim and goals that are found in the NSS.

⁸ Bush, 29.

⁹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005), iii.

¹⁰ Rumsfeld, 10.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12-14.

¹³ *Ibid.*, iii.

¹⁴ Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 – A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), iii.

¹⁵ Jeffrey D. Brake, “Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues,” January 8, 2001; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/RS20771.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2005.

¹⁶ U.S. Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive*, 63.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 64. A central objective of the September 2001 QDR was to shift from a “threat-based” force development strategy to a “capabilities-based” strategic model for the future. The 2005 QDR is forecasted to be a document that almost solely focuses on force development, leaving the defense strategy to the *National Defense Strategy* document.

¹⁸ Joseph Lieberman, U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, “QDR for the Future: Capabilities, Army Must Grow To Meet 21st-Century Needs,” *DefenseNews*, 6 February 2006, 29.

¹⁹ Lieberman, 29.

²⁰ Michael Vickers, "2005 QDR Puts U.S. on Right Path," *DefenseNews*, 6 February 2006, 29.

²¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Reality Check for the Rumsfeld Doctrine", *Financial Times* (April 29, 2003); available from <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20030429.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2005.

²² Thomas L. McNaugher, "Planning Future Defense: Time to Confront the Cold War Mindset," *The Brookings Review* (Summer 1996 Vol. 14 No. 3): 29; available from <http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/summer96/mcnaugher.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2005. The defense train wreck refers to the impending collision of the requirement to replace aging equipment with the fiscal constraints of the DoD budget.

²³ Maj Jonathan Hull, USMC. "Sell It to the Marines," *Proceedings* 123/10/1,136 (October 1997): 67.

²⁴ Adm M. G. Mullen, USN, "CNO Guidance 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era," 22 July 2005; available from <http://www.navy.mil/features/2006CNOG.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2005.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Gen M. W. Hagee, USMC, "33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps Guidance," 13 January 2003; available from [http://www.marines.mil/cmc/33cmc.nsf/attachments/\\$FILE/33cpg.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/cmc/33cmc.nsf/attachments/$FILE/33cpg.pdf); Internet; accessed 11 November 2005.

²⁷ Gen M. W. Hagee, USMC, "ALMAR 018/05, 33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps Updated Guidance (The 21st Century Marine Corps - Creating Stability in an Unstable World)," 18 April 2005; available from <http://www.marines.mil/almars/anmar2000.nsf/52f4f5d11f10b4c4852569b8006a3e35/35a74723d7bcc61085256fe70061040a?OpenDocument>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2005.

²⁸ Adm Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." *Proceedings* 128/10/1,196 (October 2002): 33.

²⁹ Adm Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, "Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era," 12 June 2002; available from <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pao/cnoremaksCSF.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2005.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Posen, 5.

³³ Ibid., 17.

³⁴ Ibid., 35.

³⁵ U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Concepts Division, *United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century* (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), I-3.

³⁶ Ibid., I-22.

³⁷ Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC, "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," *Proceedings* 123/1/1,127 (January 1997): 29.

³⁸ Bush, 29.

³⁹ Krulak, 26. Strategic inflection point – a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are about to change. Andy Groves, President and CEO, Intel Corporation.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 30.

⁴¹ McNaugher, 26.

⁴² James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," *The National Interest*, 43 (Spring 1996): 3.

⁴³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (Oxford University Press, 1963), 114.